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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ATTORNEYS
POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO DISBAR
A judge denied a proper motion for a change of'venue and later
allowed a large fee to his father and law partner as attorney for
the receiver. Held, that change of venue be allowed and that a com-
mission of lawyers be appointed to investigate the receivership pro-
ceedings to ascertain whether future action should be taken because
of the conduct of any member of the bar connected therewith and,
if so, to institute appropriate proceedings.1
This was the first time the Supreme Court of Indiana had on
its own initiative taken notice of apparent misconduct before another
court and ordered further proceedings pending an investigation. Prior
to 1939 the Supreme Court had never assumed original jurisdiction to
suspend or disbar an attorney; 2 but it had refused to accept jurisdic-
tion.3
The statutes of many other states have provided the authority for
disciplining attorneys by creating an incorporated state bar,4 by
authorizing the supreme court to promulgate rules to integrate the
bar,5 or by expressly authorizing the supreme court to take original
IState ex rel. Avalon Apartments Co. of Gary, Inc. v. Sammons, Spe-
cial Judge, - Ind. - , 38 N.E. (2d) 846 (1941).
2 In re Hardy, 2171 Ind. 159, 26 N.E. (2d) 921 (1940) (on memorandum
from appellate court, Supreme Court issued rule to show cause
why attorney shouldn't be disciplined for tampering with record to
appellate court; rule was discharged on failure of evidence);
In re Murray, 216 Ind. 295, 24 N.E. (2d) 288 (1939) (ordered not
to appear before Supreme Court for one year for changing tran-
script filed before Supreme Court); State ex reL Indianapolis
Bar Ass'n v. Hartman, 216 Ind. 89, 23 N.E. (2d) 437 (1939) (on in-
formation of State Bar the Supreme Court disbarred attorney from
practicing in all courts of state for fraud in application for ad-
mission).
3 Vivian Colliers Co. v. Cahall, 184 Ind. 473, 110 N.E. 672 (1915)
(Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to reverse a judgment in case
appealed on confession of error arising from alleged misconduct
of attorneys); see Walls v. Palmer, 64 Ind. 493, 497 (1879)
(whether an attorney be denied the right to practice before a
circuit court would not in any way affect the exercise of the
functions and power of the Supreme Court).
4 CAL. CODES, GEN. LAWS & CONST. (Deering, Supp. 1939) Business and
Professions Code § 6001 (established incorporated state bar); id.
§§ 6078, 6087 and 6100 (authorized Board of Governors to hold
hearings and recommend discipline to Supreme Court, and provid-
ing that attorney may be disbarred by Supreme Court on its own
initiative or on information of others); wIS. STAT. (1941) 256.28
(state bar authorized to conduct prosecutions, hearings before
referee, and to recommend to Supreme Court); WASH. REV. STAT.
N. (Remmington, Supp. 1939) § 138. For a discussion of the
constitutionality of these acts see In 'e Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108
P. (2d) 858 (1940); notes (1938) 114 A. L. . 161; note (1937)
26 KY. LAW GUILD q. 65.
5 Wyo. Laws 1939, c. 97.
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jurisdiction of cases of misconduct.6 In Indiana no express statutory
authority exists for such action, 7 although such authority might be
implied.8
Since the beginning of our judicial system the inferior courts
of record have assumed the power to discipline attorneys practicing
before them.9 This has been termed an inherent judicial power, 0
founded on the necessity of protecting the court and in the interest of
its efficient operation. 11 The supreme courts of many states have
assumed jurisdiction to discipline attorneys for misconduct on the
basis of this inherent power.12 However, this inherent power to dis-
cipline is limited in most cases to jurisdiction bver attorneys who are
6 ILL. REV. STAT. (Bar Ass'n Ed., 1937) c. 13, § 6 (gives Supreme Court
power to strike name of attorney from roll for misconduct); Ill.
Sup. Court Rules (April, 1933) (appointed Board of Governors
of Illinois Bar Association and Board of Governors of Chicago
Bar Association to investigate, hold hearings, and recommend to
the Supreme Court); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Michie, Supp. 1939) c. 221.§ 40; MICH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1929) §§ 13584 to 13586
(charge may be filed by attorney general in Supreme Court
and removal or suspension is effective in every court of
the state); MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1929) § 5697 (action may be taken
by Supreme Court on its own initiative); N, Y4 JUDICIARY LAW § 478
(suspension or removal of an attorney by the Supreme Court is
effective in every court of the state); id. § 88 (authorizes Court
of Appeals to discipline); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937)
§ 1707 (if misconduct comes to attention of Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals it is their duty to cause proceedings to be in-
stituted), see In re Thatcher, 80 0. St. 412, 508, 89 N.E. 39, 88(1909). But see: Legal Club of Lynchburg v. Light, 157 Va. 249,
119 S. E. 55 (1923).
7For provisions regarding disbarment of attorneys see IND. STAT. ANN.
(Burns, Supp. 1941) §§ 4-3614 to 4-3618; IND. ADM. CODE (Horack,
1941) §§ 4-3614 to 4-3618.
8 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns' Supp. 1941) § 4-3608, IND. ADM. CODE (Horack,
1941) § 4-3608. "The Supreme Court shall have exclusive juris-
diction to admit attorneys to practice law in all courts of the
state under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe." IND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns, Supp. 1941) § 4-3614, INDj ADM. CODE (Horack,
1941) § 4-3614 (authorizes any court of record to suspend for
cause); IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, Supp. 1941) § 4-3617, IND. ADM.
CODE (Horack, 1941) § 4-3617 (proceedings may be started by
direction of the court by appointing an attorney to draw up and
prosecute the accusation).
0 In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933) ; In re Wolfe's
Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 AtI. 732 (1927); notes (1935) 69
A. L. R. 705, (1935) 96 A. L. R. 686; (1934) 7 FLA. ST. B. A. J. 183.
'
0 WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936) 145.
1 Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary (1935) 11 IND. L. 3.
116, 127.
'
2 1n re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933); In re
Hansen, 101 Mont. 49, 54 P. (2d) 882 (1936); In re Royall, 34
N. M. 554, 286 Pac. 156 (1930); Iii re Brown, 64 S. D. 87, 264
N. W. 521 (1936). Some courts have held that this power is
superior to statutory and constitutional provision. State v. Conner,
196 Wis. 534, 221 N. W. 603 (1929); see In re Haddad, 106 Vt.
322, 173 Atl. 103 (1934).
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members of the bar of the supreme court.13 For example, the Supreme
Court of Indiana on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction has re-
fused to punish a corporation for the unauthorized practice of law.
14
But other courts have assumed jurisdiction to punish by contempt in
similar instances.' 5 In view of the purpose of all disciplinary action,' 6
there exists no reason why the Supreme Court should not assume
jurisdiction over all cases of misconduct by attorneys or for unau-
thorized practice of law. 7 A necessary corollary to this power is
the ability of the court to initiate proceedings on its own motion' 8 and
order investigations.19 The Supreme Court of Illinois led the way
by punishing for the unauthorized practice of law in an original
proceeding over ten years ago.20 It is urged that similar results may
well obtain in Indiana.
13 See In re Hardy, 217 Ind. 159, 26 N. E. (2d) 921 (1940); State
ez rel. Indianapolis Bar Ass'n v. Hartman, 216 Ind. 89, 23 N. E.
(2d) 477 (1939). In re Hansen, 101 Mont. 49, 54 P. (2d) 882
(1936) (officers of the court); State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221
N. W. 603 (1929) (officers of the court). This will cause no
difficulty in Indiana as to attorneys admitted since 1933. IND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 4-3605, IND. ADM. CODE (Horack, 1941)
§ 4-3605 (all attorneys are now admitted to the bar of the Su-
preme Court). See Ind. Sup. Court Rule 3-5, IND. ADM. CODE
(Horack, 1941) § 4-3605-2.
14 See State ex Tel. Indianapolis Bar Ass'n v. Fletcher Trust Co.,
211 Ind. 27, 38, 5 N. E. (2d) 538, 543 (1937). "This court has
no jurisdiction over one who is not a member of the bar and who
is practicing law to punish him for contempt, except for some
act which affects or interferes with the functioning of this
court . . . . .
'5 State ex rel. Johnson, Atty. Gen. v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N. W.
381 (1941) State ex rel. Freebourn, Atty. Gen. v. Merchants'
Credit Service, 104 Mont. 76, 66 P. (2d) 337 (1937); In re Morse,
98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550 (1924).
16 See note 12, supra. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288, 289,
2 S. Ct. 569, 588, 589, 27 L. Ed. 552, 561, 562 (1882). "The pro-
ceeding is not for the purpose of punishment, but for the purpose
of preserving the courts of justice from the official ministration
of persons unfit to practice therein."
17 Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary (1935) 11 IND. L. J.
132. ". . . throughout the United States, and specifically in In-
diana, broad inherent judicial authority is found to exist, ample
for the betterment and control of the bar."
s In re Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 192 N. E. 65, 96 A. L. P. 679, 686
(1934); People em reL. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N. E.
487, 60 A. Li R. 851, 860 (1934); 5 Am. Jur. (1936) § 289, Attor-
neys at Law.
19In 'e Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 192 N. E. 65, 96 A. L. R. 679, 686
(1934) (general investigation); accord, In re Hansen, 101 Mont.
49, 54 P. (2d) 882 (1936); State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 477, 91 Atl.
274 (1914). WILS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936) 145 (inquestorial
procedure to learn the facts); Dowling, The Inherent Power of the
Judiciy (1935) 11 IND. L. T. 116 (inquiry into conduct of indi-
vidual, or general investigation).
2OPeople ez rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 334 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931). Although the
respondent had never appeared before or in connection with the
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held that its inherent judicial
19421
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A proceeding before the Supreme Court is a summary proceed-
ing in which some of an attorney's rights are not protected in the
traditional manner.2 1 However, recent cases have by implication over-
ruled prior decisions which entitled the accused attorney to a jury
trial.22 Notice and opportunity for a hearing must be given the at-
torney, but courts may inquire into the conduct of attorneys without
infringing rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States 23 and without violating the Indiana Con-
stitution.24
EVIDENCE
ADMISSIONS BY FALIURE TO ANSWER LETTERS
Plaintiff sued to recover amounts deducted from his salary for
pension reserves. On a counterclaim for losses resulting from plain-
tiff's acts, defendant, among other things, introduced in evidence
letters, detailing specific items of plaintiff's embezzlements, which
were delivered to plaintiff, but to which plaintiff made no reply.
Held, this failure to reply constituted tacit admission of the charges
in the letters. Boerner v. United States, 117 F. (2d) 387 (C.C.A. 2d,
1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 587 (1941), (1942) 17 iND. L. T. 438.
The familiar legal maxim, qui tacet consentire videtur (silence gives
consent) is not generally applicable to unanswered letters, as it is
power included all powers necessary for the complete performance
of judicial functions, including the power to discipline or disbar
attorneys for misconduct, and to punish for contempt those who
practiced without authority. That such power does not vest by.
virtue of the fact that the attorney is admitted to the bar of
the Supreme Court, but that it extends throughout its territorialjurisdiction.
21 In re Darrow, 175 Ind. 14, 92 N. E. 309 (1910) (pleadings and trial
shall be the same as in other cases of a civil nature: there shall
be adverse parties, issues joined, a jury trial, and change of venue
if necessary); Ex parte Trippe, 66 Ind. 531 (1879) (entitled to
notice and trial); Heffner v. Joyne, 39 Ind. 463 (1872) (complaint
must request disbarment); Reilly, v. Cavanough, 32 Ind. 214 (1869)
(attorney is authorized by statute to demand that issues formed
be tried by jury); Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47 (1867) (charges must
be filed and attorney accorded notice and opportunity for hear-
ing). Contra: Ex parte Robinson, 3 Ind. 52 (1851) (not entitled
to jury trial).
22 In re Hardy, 217 Ind. 159, 26 N. E. (2d) 921 (1940); State ex rel.
Indianapolis Bar Ass'n v. Hartman, 216 Ind. 89, 23 N. E. (2d)
477 (1939).
23 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288, 289, 2 S. Ct. 569, 588, 589, 27
L. Ed. 552, 561, 562 (1882). The contention that a summary
proceeding against an attorney to exclude him from the practice
of law for acts for which he may be indicted and held for trial
by jury is in violation of the Fifth Amendment as depriving him
of property without due process of law is unfounded. "It is a
mistaken idea that due process of law requires a plenary suit
and a trial by jury, in all cases where property or personal rights
are involved." In re Mayberry, 295 Mass. 155, 3 N. E. (2d) 248
(1936); In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933).
6 Ri C. L. (1915) § 453, Constitutional Law.
24 See note 22, aupra.
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